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Abstract 
This paper discusses the potential role of a Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (EMA) in helping 
Middle East and North African governments implement structural economic reforms. The 
arguments for and against preferential liberalization are summarized, identifying a number of 
necessary conditions for an EMA to benefit a Mediterranean country. The recently negotiated 
EMA between Tunisia and the EU is evaluated, using these conditions as criteria. Some 
doubts are expressed regarding the benefits of an EMA and the extent it will help countries in 
the region "catch up" with those in Central and Eastern Europe. Significant supporting and 
complementary actions are likely to be needed. Key issues in this connection are the 
regulatory regimes applying to inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and the service sector; a 
reduction in tariffs applied to the rest of the world; and the imposition of hard budget 
constraints on state-owned enterprises. These aspects are not subject to disciplines under the 
EMA. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There has been a marked shift in many countries since the early 1980s towards liberalizing 
international trade. To a large extent this reflects a recognition that such intervention is often not 
only inefficient, but also ineffective and counterproductive. Governments around the globe are 
increasingly seeking to create an enabling environment allowing private individuals and firms to 
employ the nation's resources more efficiently. This enabling environment includes the provision of 
public goods such as a stable, business-friendly legal framework that allows contracts to be enforced 
rapidly and at low cost; a regulatory regime that fosters and maintains competition on product and 
factor markets; and the provision of basic education and health services. While trade liberalization 
is a powerful instrument for increasing competition, formal trade policies such as the level and 
dispersion of the tariff are only one aspect of the trade regime. As important are trade institutions: 
the framework in which policies are determined and the administrative mechanisms through which 
they are implemented and enforced. Traders need to confront as little uncertainty as possible 
regarding the rules that apply, the taxes that must be paid, or the time taken up by customs clearance. 
The major policy issue facing many of the countries in the MENA region is to follow the rest of the 
world in liberalizing, privatizing and deregulating markets. The role of the public sector in many 
MENA countries is still pervasive. In some parts of the region the public sector accounts for more 
than one-half of GDP, and employs over 60 percent of skilled workers (World Bank, 1995a). Trade 
barriers remain high. Average taxes on trade are around 15 percent, more than twice the level 
applying in Eastern Europe (Appendix Table 1). Para-tariffs of many kinds are prevalent, reducing 
the transparency of the trade regime. A basic tenet of economic reform efforts undertaken in the last 
decade in many countries of the region has been that reform be gradual. Given that gradual trade 
reform has often not been accompanied by actions to significantly reduce the role of the State in the 
economy, reform efforts have had a limited impact in terms of effectively increasing competition on 
product markets (Hoekman, 1995a). The slower the pace of economic reform and the less 
comprehensive its scope, the larger the gap between MENA's performance and that of the rest of the 
world is likely to become. The implicit rationale for gradualism in the region appears to be a 
perception that a "big bang" approach is not feasible politically.' What is needed is an institutional 
framework that enhances the credibility of a gradual reform strategy and thus ensures the needed 
supply response. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union's (EU) offer to 
establish a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area are particularly relevant in this regard. 
The need for reform is clear--economic performance has been lagging, and the incentive regime is 
steadily falling behind that of comparator countries (World Bank, 1995a). The aim of this paper is 
to discuss the potential role of a Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (EMA) in helping MENA 
governments implement structural economic reforms. It is organized as follows. Section II discusses 
the arguments for and against preferential liberalization in the MENA setting, comparing the potential 
costs and benefits of a multilateral (WTO) as opposed to a regional integration strategy. Section III 
describes the recent trade performance of Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) to 
That is to say, the economic situation has never deteriorated to such an extent that "shock therapy" was unavoidable. 
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illustrate the possible impact of opening up the economy to trade in the context of a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with the EU. Section IV turns to the recently negotiated EMA between Tunisia 
and the EU, and asks to what extent it will help Mediterranean countries catch up with the CEECs. 
Some doubts can be expressed in this connection if significant supporting and complementary actions 
are not taken. Key issues in this connection are the regulatory regimes applying to inward foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and the service sector, the magnitude of tariffs applied to the rest of the world 
(trade diversion), the extent of privatization, and the imposition of hard budget constraints on state- 
owned enterprises. Most of these aspects are not subject to disciplines under the EMA. Section V 
concludes. 
U. WHY GO REGIONAL? 
There are a variety of options for governments seeking to liberalize trade and investment regimes, 
including unilateral action, multilateral liberalization based on reciprocity, and preferential (regional) 
liberalization. For a small country--one that cannot influence its terms of trade for most commodities- 
-unilateral free trade is predicted by economic theory to be welfare superior to the other options. If, 
in the context of multilateral negotiations, other countries reciprocate, this will increase the gains 
from unilateral liberalization efforts. However, given the small country assumption--which applies 
to the countries in the region--there are few if any gains to be expected from making liberalization 
conditional upon reciprocity by trading partners. Preferential liberalization through the negotiation 
of a FTA will also be an inferior strategy. The reason is simple: the world market is always larger 
than a regional one. By not discriminating across potential trading partners, domestic firms and 
consumers will be allowed to buy goods and services from least cost suppliers, wherever they are 
located. By discriminating in favor of specific countries, the possibility arises of trade diversion--the 
elimination of tariffs for partner countries may induce consumers and firms to source from less 
efficient suppliers located in a partner country, rather than from the least cost source of supply. This 
may be offset by trade creation--a shift towards sourcing form more efficient suppliers in the partner 
country after the elimination of trade barriers. The point, however, is that through unilateral 
liberalization such losses do not occur, and the net gains are greater. 
The case against regional (preferential) trade agreements is particularly strong in the context of small 
countries that already have duty free access to a large partner country market but maintain tariffs on 
imports originating in this partner country. This is the case for the Mediterranean countries, which 
were granted duty-free access to EU markets for industrial (non-agricultural) goods under 
Cooperation Agreements negotiated in the 1970s. In such cases, as argued by Panagariya (1995), 
Mediterranean countries that enter into a FTA with the EU will lose the tariff revenue presently 
collected on imports of EU origin. The EU accounts for 48 percent of total imports by all MENA 
countries, a share that will increase after the implementation of free trade with Europe. The revenue 
loss is therefore substantial. It is equivalent to a transfer from Mediterranean governments 
(consumers) to EU exporters. The static benefits arising from improved resource allocation are 
unlikely to offset this loss (see Panagariya, 1995). Of course, dynamic benefits (induced growth 
effects driven by increased factor accumulation) may well ensure that longer term returns are positive. 
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The point, again, is that these benefits can in principle also be attained through unilateral 
liberalization, without the associated losses.' 
Although these are powerful logical arguments in favor of nondiscriminatory liberalization, many 
countries nonetheless pursue preferential trade agreements. What explains this? More importantly, 
what are the necessary conditions for regional integration to be welfare enhancing for the countries 
involved?3 Possible economic explanations or motivations for regional integration are manifold. Five 
will be mentioned here. Before doing so, it must be recognized that regional integration is often 
driven by foreign policy and political considerations. Possible economic losses (inefficiencies) may 
be accepted as the price for attaining non-economic objectives. This aspect of regional integration 
is undoubtedly important in practice. From an economic perspective what matters then is that 
policymakers (and voters) have enough information to allow them to judge whether the non- 
economic benefits compensate for possible economic losses. 
1. Credibility and dynamic gains A regional integration agreement (RIA) may offer a stronger 
mechanism for locking in (anchoring) economic reforms than the WTO. In part this may be because 
the RIA addresses policy areas that are not covered by the WTO at all, or where WTO disciplines are 
weak. For example, investment or factor market policies are not addressed by the WTO. WTO 
disciplines pertaining to services policies are relatively weak.' Thus, unilateral reforms in these areas 
may be anchored through a RIA in ways that are not available in the WTO. Even in the area of trade 
policies, the traditional domain of the GATT, WTO disciplines may be weaker than under a RIA. 
Credibility under the WTO arises in large part from the binding of tariffs. The most that can be done 
in this connection is to bind tariffs at applied rates. This is something most developing countries have 
not done, in part because of the mercantilistic bias of the GATT negotiating process (governments 
wanted to keep "negotiating chips"), and in part because many did not desire to be bound by GATT 
rules. Although there is a trend that governments are increasingly asked to reduce the difference 
between bound and applied rates, there is no requirement to bind at applied rates. Binding at applied 
rates has been a voluntary step for developing country governments. This in turn increased the 
political difficulty for governments to do so. In a RIA of the kind envisaged by the EU, binding is 
not voluntary, but required. A RIA may therefore help overcome internal political resistance to 
2 The losses do not arise under unilateral liberalization because there is then no transfer of tariff revenue to EU firms. 
Instead, domestic consumers obtain a welfare gain as the tariff revenue equivalent accrues to them in the form of lower 
prices for goods. 
' In what follows we abstract from the systemic or global welfare implications of regional integration. These are 
controversial and the subject of ongoing debate. See Bhagwati (1993) and the contributions in Anderson and Blackhurst 
(1993). 
See Hoekman (1995b) for a detailed analysis of the GATS. 
3 
binding and the mercantilistic biases of the GATT process.' It may also lead to greater credibility if 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are stronger. 
The greater credibility that may be associated with a RIA, can lead to higher dynamic growth effects 
insofar as more investment is fostered, greater adjustment efforts are made, etc. These effects of 
enhanced credibility are of course the important dimension. Unfortunately, quantifying them is very 
difficult. However, the cross-border merger and acquisition activity that was associated with the EU's 
Single Market program in the late 1980s is indicative of the type of market response that may emerge 
following the initiation of a credible regional liberalization strategy. 
2. Harmonization An important element of a RIA may consist of harmonizing regulatory regimes 
and administrative requirements relating to product standards, testing and certification procedures, 
mutual recognition agreements, common documents for customs clearance (e.g., the EU's Single 
Administrative Document), coordination and cooperation on linking computer systems of Customs, 
etc. These are areas where the WTO is restricted to general principles (i.e., national treatment and 
MFN). While such cooperative efforts can be pursued unilaterally, formal agreements may be 
necessary to induce the administrative bodies involved to cooperate. The associated reduction in 
trade and transactions costs will benefit all traders and consumers. Insofar as reductions in 
transactions costs are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, trade diversion type issues do not arise. 
3. Security of market access A benefit of a RIA may be that it allows the countries involved to 
agree to eliminate the possibility of imposing contingent protection, such as antidumping actions. To 
the extent that a substantial share of total trade is with partner countries, such agreement could be 
of great value. In the multilateral context such an agreement is unlikely to be feasible in the near 
future. Harmonization of administrative requirements and procedures may also help to improve the 
security of market access. An important area in this connection relates to product standards and their 
enforcement. 
4. Transfers Another potential benefit of a RIA is that it may involve transfers from richer members 
to poorer ones. Such transfers may be financial, or take the form of technical assistance. To the 
extent that such transfers are conditional upon membership of the RIA (i.e., are additional), they will 
help offset the possible losses associated with the implicit transfer of tariff revenue and the costs of 
trade diversion. Additionality is important, and much may depend on how this is measured. For 
example, the Mediterranean countries already receive significant financial assistance from the EU, 
both through bilateral official aid, and through the Financial Protocols that are negotiated every 4 
years under auspices of the Cooperation Agreements. It can be argued that what matters in this 
connection is the comparison between the present discounted value of the expected transfers under 
s Enforcement of binding commitments may also be stronger under a RIA. In GATT, the ultimate enforcement is 
retaliation by "principal suppliers," the countries with whom a tariff concession was originally negotiated. Such 
retaliation, if it occurs, will take the form of increases in tariffs on exports of the country violating a binding. This may 
not constitute a sufficient deterrent threat. Alternatively, the country may offer to compensate principal suppliers by 
lowering other tariffs (on an MFN basis). These mechanisms may not exist in the RIA context. In the EU context, a 
FTA will not make allowances for the permanent re-imposition of tariffs. GATT does. 
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status quo arrangements (Cooperation Agreements) and those that are expected under the new 
regime (the EMA). Given the generally declining trend in official aid, and the emergence of the 
CEECs as new "claimants," taking past transfers as the basis for an "additionality" test is probably 
unrealistic. 
5. Facilitation of general liberalization A final, and very important potential rationale for regional 
integration along EMA lines is if it is used as part of a deliberate strategy to liberalize the economy 
more generally, i.e., on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis. The possible loss associated with a EMA 
will be reduced if efforts are made to reduce trade barriers confronting non-partner countries. 
Adjustment costs associated with liberalization on an MFN basis are not likely to be much higher than 
those emerging from regional liberalization with the EU. The offer of financial and other assistance 
from the EU can then be used to facilitate the transition path to MFN reductions in trade barriers. 
Stated otherwise, the EMA may allow a government to enhance the political feasibility of MFN 
liberalization. 
These are possible economic arguments favoring a regional strategy. The extent to which they are 
sufficient to ensure a welfare gain for a Mediterranean country is an empirical matter. It depends on 
the contents of the trade agreement that is negotiated, the magnitude of the additional financial and 
other types of transfers, and the intentions of the governments involved. In the Mediterranean 
context, necessary conditions for a Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (EMA) to be welfare improving 
is that the transfer of tariff revenue/trade diversion costs is offset; that the EMA goes significantly 
beyond the current WTO disciplines--especially in areas such as investment and services; and that 
significant progress will be made in the area of trade facilitation--customs procedures, documentary 
requirements, product testing and certification. To the extent that the security of market access is 
enhanced, this will strengthen the case in favor of regional integration. The next Section will discuss 
to what extent these necessary conditions appear to have been met. In general, most RIAs have not 
satisfied them. Indeed, historically preferential trade agreement generally have not gone much beyond 
the GATT (Hoekman and Leidy, 1993). 
The possible loss associated with a EMA will be reduced the more competitive are EU suppliers, and 
the lower are the tariffs imposed on imports of EU goods by Mediterranean countries. The loss may 
be further reduced if efforts are made to reduce trade barriers confronting non-partner countries. 
Indeed, the importance of this cannot be over-emphasized. The strongest case that can be made in 
favor of regional integration along EMA lines is if it is used as part of a deliberate strategy to 
liberalize the economy more generally, i.e., on an MFN basis. Very much depends in this connection 
on the willingness of the government to state clearly that general, MFN liberalization of the trade 
regime is indeed its objective. If this is not done, incentives may easily be created for the formation 
of coalitions between EU and domestic firms that oppose further opening of the market to (more 
efficient) third country suppliers. As noted by Bhagwati (1993), they may argue that the regional 
market is "our" market, that outsiders trade "unfairly" because they are subject to a more lenient 
regulatory environment etc. 
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III. THE EUROPE AGREEMENTS AND RECENT TRADE PERFORMANCE OF THE 
CEECs6 
This Section briefly describes recent developments in MENA and CEEC trade with the European 
Union, exploring the impact of measures to open the economy to international trade. While the 
comparison is somewhat "unfair" given the greater level of industrialization and human capital that 
exists in Eastern Europe, the parallels between the two regions are close enough that a comparison 
is informative. Many countries in both regions start reforms in the late 1980s; the level of state 
intervention in both regions was high; and both are in proximity to the European Union. Moreover, 
although CMEA-based trade dominated in the CEEC context, it was also significant for a number of 
Mediterranean countries (e.g., Egypt). Clearly the similarities should not be exaggerated. But 
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the CEEC experience is informative because it provides data on the possible impact of an EMA. 
Per capita exports for the MENA region as a whole are around US $225. They rose slightly between 
1989 and 1994, with the share of exports going to the EU declining to 36.6 percent (Figure 1). 
MENA exports to the EU are largely due to North Africa, which exports most of its manufactured 
goods to Europe. For the Middle Eastern countries the EU is much less important. Although 
6 This Section summarizes and updates material contained in Hoekman (1995). 
E 
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aggregate exports of the CEECs to the world initially declined after 1989--reflecting a large drop in 
output and exports as enterprises adjusted to price liberalization and the demise of centralized trade-- 
by 1993 per capita exports exceeded 1989 levels again. Whereas only some 29 percent of CEEC 
exports went to the EU in 1989, the proportion had risen to over 60 percent in 1994. The average 
annual growth rate of exports to the EU (20.4 percent) is two and a half times that of MENA 
countries (Table 1). 
Table 1: Non-Oil Exports to EU, 1989 and 1994 (ECU million) 
Source: EUR 
Country Value Market Share in 
EU 
1989 1994 Growth 1989 1994 
MENA 9,940 14,485 7.8 2.68 2.68 
Jordan 86 152 12.1 0.02 0.03 
Lebanon 100 87 -2.8 0.03 0.02 
Syria 90 234 21.0 0.02 0.04 
Israel 3,014 4,043 6.1 0.81 0.75 
Egypt 790 1,107 6.9 0.21 0.20 
Morocco 2,612 3,652 7.0 0.70 0.67 
Tunisia 1,596 2,784 14.8 0.43 0.51 
Algeria 219 328 8.4 0.06 0.06 
Saudi Arabia 890 1,234 6.7 0.24 0.22 
Kuwait 131 169 5.2 0.04 0.03 
U.A.E. 414 695 10.9 0.11 0.12 
CEEC 10,336 26,115 20.4 2.79 4.83 
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Intra-industry trade has been expanding very rapidly between the CEECs and the EU (Figure 2). 
Intra-industry trade is important because it is one mechanism through which transfers of technology 
can occur. The Europe Agreements with the CEECs have created incentives for EU 
suppliers/retailers to engage in so-called outward processing trade (OPT). This consists of shipping 
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exported back to the EU supplier/retailer. Such processing trade benefits from liberal access to the 
EU, and has been used intensively for sectors such as garments, electrical machinery and furniture. 
As part of the subcontracting that is involved, EU counterparts will often provide designs, monitor 
quality, take care of marketing, etc. This is a good way for firms in partner countries to reduce the 
costs and risks associated with development of export markets, while at the same time obtaining 
know-how from suppliers. While OPT is frequently restricted, at least in the initial stages, to labor 
intensive, low value added activities, these can create significant employment. 
In the period following the implementation of the agreements with the CEECs, exports after outward 
processing accounted for about 18 percent of total CEEC exports to the EU in 1993, up from 10 
percent in 1989. For Romania, processing activities generated 30 percent of exports to the EU in 
1993. In contrast, exports to the EU of processed goods represented only 1.7 percent of total MENA 
exports in 1993, a share that has remained constant since 1989 (Table 2). Most of the processing 
occurs in leather/footwear, clothing, electrical machinery, precision instruments and furniture. OPT 
accounts for a substantial share (about one quarter) of the growth in exports from the CEECs to the 
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EU (Hoekman, 1995a). In contrast, it plays a very minor role in MENA, the two exceptions being 
Morocco and Tunisia.' 
Table 2: Exports After Outward Processing (Share in Total exports to EU) 
CEEC MENA 
1989 1993 1989 1993 
Total 10.4 17.9 1.6 1.7 
Leather 38.9 34.5 8.0 8.5 
Garments 60.8 74.5 15.6 11.1 
Machinery 8.1 14.4 5.4 2.6 
Transport 12.3 4.7 4.5 2.3 
Instruments 6.4 11.9 6.5 2.5 
Furniture 26.5 13.9 1.2 1.5 
Source: EUROSTAT, COMEXT database. 
The data reveal clearly that the CEECs are moving rapidly to exploit their geographic proximity to 
the EU, which in conjunction with their relatively low wages and significant stocks of human capital 
makes them formidable competitors for the MENA region. The geographic advantage that the 
MENA region used to have--because Eastern Europe was effectively closed to open exchange with 
the West--has now disappeared. MENA firms must now compete head-to-head with companies 
located in the CEECs. This is indeed a challenge, not least because relative labor costs in the CEECs 
and MENA are not that different. Per capita incomes in the CEECs--one proxy for such costs--are 
close to MENA levels (World Bank, 1995a). Although factor endowments differ in important 
respects, it is also noteworthy that some of the CEECs are producing and exporting similar products 
to the EU. Correlation coefficients between revealed comparative advantage indices' of MENA and 
CEEC countries are sometimes significant. Table 3 reports those cases where such correlation 
coefficients are above 0.1. In general, however, the data suggest that competition between firm 
located in different CEECs is more intense than that between the two regions. 
' The welfare implications of OPT may be ambiguous, insofar as the policy regime induces EU sourcing of inputs that 
are more costly than what is available on the world market. 
8 The RCA is defined as: 
E,i x/E"1X 
where x;; are exports of commodity i by countryj, Xj are countryj's total exports, and N is the number of countries. 
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Table 3: Correlation Coefficients Between Revealed Comparative Advantage Indices, 1994 
Bulgaria Czech Republic Hungary Poland Romania 
Bulgaria 1.00 
Czech Rep. 0.19 1.00 
Hungary 0.37 0.23 1.00 
Poland 0.48 0.47 0.60 1.00 
Romania 0.33 0.49 0.48 0.60 1.00 
Jordan 0.23 0.14 0.05 0.22 0.08 
Lebanon 0.23 0.03 0.17 0.08 0.06 
Syria 0.01 0.01 0.13 -0.01 0.01 
Tunisia 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.22 
UAE 0.11 0.04 0.26 0.26 0.20 
ALL MENA 0.13 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.06 
The extent to which the export performance of the CEECs is due to the Europe Agreements is very 
difficult to determine. It can be argued that to a large extent much of this would have been realized 
if the CEECs that were GATT contracting parties had simply locked in their trade liberalization 
through the WTO. Indeed, the GATT played a significant role in locking in CEEC trade policy 
reforms, as most of the CEECs had low, bound tariffs. Once centralized trade was abolished, GATT 
commitments ensured a substantial amount of discipline. However, the Europe Agreements go far 
beyond the WTO, basically extending much of the EU's Single Market rules to the CEECs. They 
provided an important political signal that the CEECs could aspire to membership of the EU-- 
something that was acknowledged explicitly by the EU in June 1993 during the Copenhagen summit. 
They thus greatly reduced uncertainty for investors regarding the future policy environment. There 
are differences in opinion regarding the extent to which Agreements were instrumental in preventing 
the re-imposition of protection. Sapir (1995) argues that at least in the case of Hungary, the 
Agreement helped the Government resist pressures for protection;' Csaba (1995) argues that the 
Europe Agreements are too narrow in scope to create the institutional infrastructure needed to 
maintain a free trade stance. In his view it is the credible prospect of EU membership that is the key 
dimension in the CEEC context, as it is only this that will fundamentally constrain the use of various 
non-tariff barriers. 
9 Indeed, he also notes that the WTO was not considered a binding constraint by the Hungarian government; what 
counted was the commitment towards the EU. 
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EU membership is not on the Mediterranean agenda. As far as MENA is concerned, the CEEC 
experience under the Europe Agreements that is perhaps of greatest relevance is the importance of 
OPT in driving export performance. While a EMA may enhance the incentives to use OPT, it should 
be recognized that MENA countries already have access to this customs regime. The lack of OPT 
in the MENA region suggests the existence of administrative or regulatory barriers in MENA 
countries. These may be offset to some extent under a EMA through harmonization of procedures 
and technical assistance (economic cooperation). Action in this area is a priority to generate an 
export supply response. 
IV. THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENT WITH TUNISIA 
Currently, economic relations between Mediterranean countries and the EU are governed by 
Cooperation Agreements dating from the 1970s. These agreements are unlimited in duration, and 
provide duty-free access to EU markets for industrial goods, and preferential access for agricultural 
commodities. The agreements are not reciprocal in that partner countries may continue to apply 
MFN tariffs to goods of EU origin. They are complemented by Financial Protocols, which establish 
the amount of financial resources the EU will provide each partner country over a five year period. 
The key changes that will be implied by a EMA is a move to reciprocal free trade in industrial goods, 
and the replacement of Financial Protocols with EMA-specific financial cooperation (see below). 
The basic objectives of the Euro-Med proposal are to: achieve reciprocal free trade between the EU 
and Mediterranean countries in most manufactured goods; grant preferential and reciprocal access 
for agricultural products; establish conditions for gradual liberalization of trade in services and capital; 
and encourage the economic integration of Mediterranean countries. The goals and constraints 
imposed by Mediterranean countries are perhaps best stated in the EU Commission's request for 
negotiating authority: "in order to be able to enter progressively into free trade with the Union and 
to take on board a wide range of trade-related Community regulations (customs, standards, 
competition, intellectual property protection, liberalization of services, free capital movements, etc.) 
... Mediterranean countries ... insist on four fundamental aspects ...: the need for long transitional 
mechanisms and secure safeguards; the need to obtain improved access for their agricultural exports; 
the need for increased financial flows ... [and] the possibility to count on the Community's help to 
accelerate the modernization of their social and economic systems. "lo 
The first Euro-Med Agreement (EMA), negotiated with Tunisia, was initialed in April and signed in 
July 1995 (Hamdouch, 1995). As it is very similar in structure to the other agreements that were 
concluded subsequently (Morocco) or are still being negotiated at the time of writing (Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon) what follows restricts attention to the Tunisian EMA. The agreement is unlimited in 
duration and is to be implemented over a twelve year period Its operation is overseen by an 
Association Council (meeting at Ministerial level at least once a year) and an Association Committee 
(meeting at the level of officials, responsible for implementation of the Agreement). The EMA has 
10 "Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership," 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament, October 1994. 
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six major elements: (1) political dialogue; (2) free movement of goods; (3) right of establishment and 
supply of services; (4) payments, capital, competition and other economic provisions (e.g., 
safeguards); (5) economic, social and cultural cooperation; and (6) financial cooperation. The 
structure of the EMA is similar to those of the Europe Agreements with the CEECs. The major 
difference is that no commitment has been made by the EU that the longer term goal is accession by 
partner countries. Many of the provisions of the EMA are conditional upon the date it enters into 
force (e.g., timing of tariff reductions). This in turn depends on how long it will take the 15 EU 
Member States and the Tunisian parliament to ratify the agreement. 
Free Movement of Goods. As noted above, Tunisia already benefits from duty-free access to EU 
markets for manufactured goods under the 1976 Cooperation Agreement, and additional Protocols 
(1982, 1988) negotiated after the enlargement of the EU in 1981 and 1986. This implies that 
liberalization will mostly occur on the Tunisian side. As discussed below, the area where Tunisia 
potentially stands to gain significantly in terms of greater export opportunities--agriculture--was 
largely removed from the table. Quotas are to be abolished upon the entry into force of the 
agreement--except as allowed by GATT rules. In contrast to the CEEC Agreements, no special 
treatment was given to Tunisia as regards more rapid elimination of textile quotas than agreed under 
the GATT. However, Tunisia is reportedly only subject to two quotas, neither of which is close to 
being fully utilized (World Bank, 1994). Tunisia committed itself to gradually reducing tariffs on 
industrial products of EU origin to zero. Five groups of products--at the 7-digit Community 
Common Nomenclature (CN) level--have been defined in this connection. Four of these groups have 
been defined explicitly in Annexes. Tariffs for the fifth group, the residual (i.e., manufactured product 
that are not mentioned in one of the Annexes) will be abolished upon the entry into force of the 
agreement. There are 470 6-digit tariff lines in this group, all of which are either intermediate inputs 
or machinery (capital goods), accounting for 10 percent of 1994 imports from the EU (Table 4).11 
Annex 3 to the Agreement contains a list of products for which tariffs and surcharges will be 
eliminated over a 5 year period in steps of 15 percent, starting from the entry into force of the treaty. 
Products on this list, together with the group of goods to be liberalized immediately (i.e., those not 
mentioned in an Annex) account for some 35 percent of 1994 imports by Tunisia. Annex 4 comprises 
a list of products that will be liberalized over the full 12 year period transition period, in steps of 8 
percent per year. Products listed in Annex 5 will commence tariff reductions four years after the 
entry into force of the agreement, with reductions spread out linearly over the remaining 8 years of 
the transition period (i.e., annual cuts of 11-12 percent). A final list of manufactured products 
contained in Annex 6 is exempted from tariff reductions. This list contains 37 6-digit tariff lines, 
comprising bread, pasta, and carpets. 
Import weighted average tariffs applying to the groups of goods to be liberalized range from 21 to 
34 percent (Table 4). Goods to be liberalized immediately have the lowest average tariffs, while those 
to be liberalized last have the highest average rates. Liberalization of intermediate inputs and capital 
" Trade data reported by EUROSTAT is either on a 6 or 8-digit level basis, making it impossible to relate exactly the 
tariff commitments (which use 7-digits) to publicly available trade statistics. However, in most cases, a concordance 
from the 7 to the 6-digit level was straightforward. 
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goods is front-loaded, whereas liberalization of consumer goods has been back-loaded. Some 90 
percent of the goods in Annexes 3 and 4 are intermediates or machinery; as compared to only 4 
percent for Annex 5. It is suggestive that some 75 percent of 1994 Tunisian exports to the EU 
involve goods contained in Annex 5. These products accounted for over 40 percent of domestic 
production in 1992. Annex 4 covers another 21', 
' 
srcent of domestic output. Much of domestic 
industry is therefore subject to gradual and back-loaded liberalization. Although this might be 
defended by arguing that it will assist the domestic industries concerned to prepare for greater 
competition from in imports in the future (in part by raising effective protection through the more 
rapid reduction in tariffs on inputs and capital goods), there is no guarantee this will occur. Much 
depends here on the perceived credibility of the government's commitment to the EU, and on the use 
of provisions allowing for safeguard protection to be imposed. Insofar as the increase in effective 
protection of domestic industries during the first part of the implementation period leads to inefficient 
investment or non-adjustment, pressures may emerge in the future to resist market opening or impose 
safeguard actions. Moreover, the transition path chosen implies that there may be static welfare 
losses quite apart from the revenue transfer problem identified by Panagariya (1995), because the 
effective rate of protection increases during the first part of the transition. iz 
The approach taken by Tunisia with respect to tariff elimination is similar to that of the CEECs, albeit 
much more gradual. Poland committed itself to eliminate tariffs on about 30% of its imports from 
the EU in 1992, and to abolish the remainder over a seven year transition period, with duty reductions 
taking place during the last four years. Hungary agreed to liberalize 12-13% of its imports over a 
three year period in annual steps of one-third, another 20% between 1995 and 1997, again in steps 
of one-third and the rest (two-thirds) between 1995 and 2001, in steps of one-sixth per year. The 
Czech and Slovak Republics dismantle tariffs over a seven year period (like Poland, but somewhat 
less front-loaded). In addition to the speed of liberalization, another important difference is that initial 
tariffs in Tunisia and the Mediterranean more generally are much higher than in the CEECs (see 
Appendix Table 1). Average protection levels in the CEECs are in the 6% range, as compared to 
over 15 percent for many Mediterranean countries. For manufacturing, the differences are even 
greater, given that the average protection rate is in the 20-30 percent range. 
A possible factor underlying the back-loaded nature of the tariff reduction process is that the 
government may have been concerned with the revenue implications of a more uniform move to free 
trade with the EU. The dependence on trade taxes in Tunisia--as in the other countries of the region- 
-is relatively high. Some 28 percent of government revenues are derived from trade taxes. The EU 
accounts for 68 percent of total imports, and generates 58 percent of total tariff revenue. Most of 
the tariff revenue generated from trade with the EU is currently collected on the imports of consumer 
goods (Annex 5) whose liberalization is back-loaded, as compared to intermediates and capital goods. 
Annex 5 accounts for 33 percent of total revenues, as compared to 12 and 9 percent, respectively, 
for Annexes 3 and 4 (Table 4). Noteworthy in this connection is that the goods to be liberalized 
immediately generate only 3.6 percent of total revenue. While the approach taken minimizes revenue 
" This is because firms get access to cheaper inputs and input tariffs fall to zero, while continuing to benefit from 
tariffs on the goods they produce. 
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losses early in the program, the revenue constraint could have been addressed in a more uniform tariff 
reduction scenario. Alternative tax bases (excises, a VAT) exist in Tunisia. 
Table 4: Tariff Liberalization: Commitments by Tunisia (Industrial Products) 
Share of Share in Share in Import Number of 6- Share of 
trade domestic total weighted digit lines Machinery and 
output tariff average Total=5019 Intermediates 
revenue tariff 
Exp Imp % of by by 
total line import 
(%) value 
ANNEX 3: 5 year 16 24 20 12.5 26.7 1810 41 93 87 
transition 
ANNEX 4: 12 year 7 29 22 9.2 30.4 1127 26 94 89 
transition 
ANNEX 5: 8 year 75 36 43 32.9 33.8 944 22 8 4 
transition starting in 
year 5 
ANNEX 6: 1 1 1 n.a. n.a. 37 1 0 0 
Exempted 
Industrial goods not 1 10 14 3.6 21.6 470 10 100 100 
listed in an Annex: 
Immediate 
liberalization 
Source: Own calculations based on COMEXT and World Bank data. All data are for 1994. 
Agriculture A distinguishing feature of the EMA is that little will change as far as agricultural trade 
is concerned. The objective of the EMA is to gradually liberalize trade in this sector. However, all 
it does in concrete terms is to largely lock in the status quo (existing preferential arrangements), while 
offering only limited improvements in access for specific products through expansion of tariff quotas 
and reduction/elimination of tariffs for specific quotas. Negotiations to improve on existing 
agricultural concessions are to be initiated after January 1, 2000. In this respect there is a substantial 
difference with the CEEC agreements. The latter, while also excluding agriculture from the reach 
of free trade, do provide detailed provisions granting CEEC farmers preferential access to EU 
markets. Continued restrictions on exports to EU agricultural markets is a major factor reducing the 
benefits of an EMA for Mediterranean countries. For a number of these countries agricultural export 
potential is important. In the Moroccan case, for example, some 28 percent of exports to the EU are 
agricultural. Excluding this from liberalization seriously limits the potential welfare gains of an EMA. 
It is not that surprising therefore that the unwillingness (inability) of the EU Commission to 
significantly expand export opportunities was the stumbling block for Morocco to reaching agreement 
with the EU (Hamdouch, 1995). 
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Establishment. The right of establishment (i.e., freedom to engage in FDI is an objective in the EMA. 
Modalities to achieve this objective are to be determined by the Association Council. No specific 
language is devoted to this subject; no time path or target date is mentioned for the realization of the 
objective. This is an area where there is a great difference with the CEEC Agreements, where the 
right of establishment is a central element. Under the latter, the EU has granted free entry and 
national treatment to all firms from the CEECs from 1992 on, except in air and inland water transport 
and maritime cabotage. The CEECs also grant free entry and national treatment to EU firms, with 
transitional periods for certain sectors or activities." This does not necessarily imply that FDI is 
restricted in Tunisia. However, it does signal that this was considered to be a "sensitive" issue, 
something that potential foreign investors may well take into account. 
Capital Movement. The EMA only requires that capital flows related to direct investment in Tunisia 
by EU firms in companies formed in accordance with current laws can move freely, and that income 
can be liquidated and repatriated. The CEEC Agreements again go further by requiring free mobility 
of capital and unrestricted repatriation of profits and initial capital of firms that establish in partner 
countries. Payment flows (current account transactions) resulting from liberalization commitments 
under the CEEC agreements are also unrestricted. Full convertibility and liberalization of capital 
account transactions are longer term objectives, although no time frame is mentioned for their 
realization. 
Supply of Services. Cross-border supply of services (i.e., cross-border trade) has been excluded from 
both the EMA and the CEEC Agreements. The latter state that trade in services is to be liberalized 
progressively, taking into account the development of the service sector in each of the CEECs. This 
includes provision through temporary movement of natural persons. No time frame is established for 
the liberalization of supply of services, nor is the achievement of freedom of supply of services 
mentioned explicitly as an ultimate objective. Separate disciplines are to be established for air and 
inland water transport after the entry into force of each agreement. During the transitional period, 
the CEECs are to progressively adopt legislation consistent with that of the EU existing at any time 
in the field of air and land transport insofar as this serves to achieve the liberalization objectives of 
the agreement. International maritime services are to be liberalized, signatories undertaking to apply 
effectively the principle of unrestricted access to the market and traffic on a commercial basis. 
" Poland, for example, granted immediate freedom of establishment and national treatment for construction and most 
manufacturing activities, with the exception of mining, processing of precious stones and metals, explosives, 
ammunition and weaponry, pharmaceuticals, alcohol, high voltage power lines and pipeline transportation. All but the 
last two activities are to be liberalized by the end of 1997, at which time most service sectors will also be liberalized 
(financial, legal and real estate services excepted). By the end of the transitional period (10 years under the CEEC 
Agreements) all sectors are to be liberalized, except for acquisition and sale of natural resources and agricultural land 
and forests. The Czech and Slovak agreements liberalize FDI in all sectors immediately, except for the defence industry; 
steel; mining; acquisition of state-owned assets under privatization; ownership, use, sale and rent of real property; and 
the financial service industry. These activities are to be liberalized by the end of the ten year transition period. The 
Hungarian agreement is similar to the other CEEC agreements except that it adds legal services and gambling, lottery 
and similar services to the list of activities excluded indefinitely. 
15 
The EMA simply refers to the obligations of each country established under the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), which did not exist at the time the Europe Agreements were 
negotiated. Obligations under the GATS do not imply much, if any, liberalization (Hoekman, 1995b). 
MENA countries made very limited commitments under the GATS, subjecting less than 10 percent 
of their service sectors to the national treatment or market access principles (Hoekman, 1995a). No 
mention is made of maritime or air transport as in the CEEC agreements. The objective of the GATS 
is not "free trade" in services. In contrast, given the objective of accession to the EU, for the CEECs 
foreign investors know that free trade and investment is the goal. Even absent the accession issue, 
it can be argued that the non-reference to the GATS in the CEEC agreements implies a stronger 
commitment to liberalization than the EMA. While it is understandable that sensitivity may exist on 
the part of the EU regarding possible labor movement associated with the provision of services-- 
something that may also play a role in the FDl/capital movement context--"reciprocity" concerns are 
not a good rationale for Mediterranean countries to abstain from making commitments in these areas. 
Competition Policy. The EMA and Europe agreements are similar with respect to the requirement 
to adopt the basic competition rules of the EU, in particular with respect to collusive behavior, abuse 
of dominant position, and competition-distorting state aid (Articles 85, 86, and 92 of the Treaty of 
Rome), insofar as they affect trade between the Community and each partner country. Implementing 
rules are to be adopted by the Association Council within five years (as opposed to three under the 
CEEC Agreements). Until then, GATT rules with respect to countervailing of subsidies will apply. 
State-aid, compatible with EU rules for disadvantaged regions (Article 92.3(a) Treaty of Rome), can 
be applied to the entire territory of Tunisia during the first five years. Such regional aid may be given 
by EU governments to regions in their countries with per capita incomes that are substantially below 
average, or to areas where there is significant unemployment. The low level of per capita incomes 
in the Mediterranean countries in comparison to those of EU states should ensure that non-industry 
specific state aids will be unconstrained in the medium term. The agreements also provide for 
enhanced transparency of state aids, each party agreeing to provide annual reports on the total 
amount and distribution of the aid given. 
In both the EMA and CEEC cases, antidumping remains applicable to trade flows between partners. 
This despite the agreement by Tunisia (and the CEECs) to apply EU competition disciplines. An 
implication is that the security of market access rationale for regional integration was not met. At 
the very least, the inclusion of an Article 91:2 Treaty of Rome analogue could have been included, 
under which it is required that as of the entry into force of the Treaty, products originating in one 
Member state and exported to another be free of duties, quotas and measures with similar effect if 
they are re-imported. That is, efforts are required to ensure that arbitrage is possible. That being 
said, it is certainly the case that the enforcement of competition laws in the MENA region is 
important, and could have major benefits in terms of ensuring that the benefits of trade liberalization 
are realized. Given the market structures existing in these countries (in particular the prevalence of 
state-owned enterprises), anti-competitive business practices may be a problem. 
The Intra Mediterranean Dimension and Rules of Origin An objective of the Tunisian agreement 
is to promote the integration of the Maghreb countries. More generally, the EU is in favor of greater 
integration of the economies of the Mediterranean countries. This is important, as the negotiation 
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of bilateral agreements between the EU and each of the Mediterranean countries would otherwise 
lead to a so-called hub-and-spoke system. A problem with such an arrangement is that it creates 
incentives for firms to locate in the 'hub', i.e., the EU, as this gives them barrier-free access to all the 
'spokes'. All other things equal, this creates forces against inward foreign direct investment by EU- 
based firms producing tradable goods. Partly for this reason the CEECs established a Central 
European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). To avoid a hub-and-spoke system from emerging, 
Mediterranean countries are well advised to pursue a similar strategy. 
Intra-regional trade in MENA is limited. In part this reflects the similarity in endowments, in part the 
non-competitiveness of processed and manufactured goods that are produced. However, while 
currently small in absolute value (some $8.3 billion in 1990, or 8 percent of total exports), relative 
to the region's participation in world trade, intra-regional trade is already quite high (Yeats, 1994; 
Ekholm et at., 1995). Thus, the trade of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Turkey with the region is four 
times more intensive than trade with the world as a whole. The only major economy in the region 
where intra-regional trade is clearly 'too low' is Israel. Given the differences in the factor 
endowments and per capita income between Israel and some of its neighbors, intra-regional trade 
should be able to grow substantially. More generally, intra-industry trade must expand if intra- 
regional trade is to grow substantially, as the endowments of many countries are quite similar. This 
has already been happening to some extent. Although most intra-regional trade was in oil and oil 
products a decade ago, the share of oil has fallen significantly, standing at only 35 percent in 1992 
(as opposed to 80 percent in 1980). Existing intra-regional trade is to some (unknown) extent driven 
by barter deals and a web of preferential, commodity-specific "protocol trade" agreements. The latter 
involve preferential tariff rates on specific lists of goods of Arab origin. In conjunction with the 
finding that intra-regional trade is already quite high, this suggests that much of this trade may consist 
of the "wrong" goods, i.e., those in which countries do not have a comparative advantage (see also 
Lawrence, et al. 1995 on this issue). Exports to non-regional partner countries may give a less biased 
view of potential trade inside the region. There appears to be little complementarity between exports 
of many of the countries in the region, in particular in the Middle East (e.g., Egypt, Jordan, Israel, 
Syria--see Appendix Table 2). 
The rules of origin that are included in a FTA with the EU and in possible intra-regional agreements 
are important as they will help determine the potential for trade diversion resulting from the FTA. 
The Tunisian agreement allows for cumulation for rules of origin purposes for products produced in 
Algeria and Morocco as well as the EU and Tunisia. This may help create backward and forward 
linkages between the Maghreb countries and enhance the potential for intra-industry trade. The 
extension of cumulation to other Mediterranean countries, and the CEECs, would be more beneficial 
to participants. This requires that barriers to intra-regional trade are eliminated, and that existing 
commodity-specific preferential trade agreements are converted into full-fledged free trade 
agreements. As noted earlier, this will also ensure that the emerging hub-and-spoke nature of the 
EU's web of trade agreements is reduced. 
There are various Articles in the EMA which mention the intra-regional dimension. Article 1, 
outlining the objectives of the EMA lists integration of the Maghreb countries as one of the 
Agreement's aims. Article 43 (on scope of economic cooperation) mentions that one objective of 
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cooperation (i.e., technical assistance) is to "foster economic integration within the Maghreb using 
any measures likely to further such relations within the region." Article 45 (Regional cooperation) 
states among other things that Parties will support activities that foster intra-regional trade within the 
Maghreb. Intra-regional integration is therefore defined rather narrowly (Maghreb, not 
Mediterranean). 
Economic Cooperation One-third of the Articles of the Tunisian EMA deal with cooperation in 
economic, social and cultural matters. The prime objective underlying economic cooperation is to 
target "first and foremost" activities "suffering the effects of internal constraints and difficulties or 
affected by the process of liberalizing Tunisia's economy as a whole, and more particularly by the 
liberalization of trade between Tunisia and the Community" (Article 43). Methods of economic 
cooperation mentioned in the EMA include information exchange, provision of expert services 
(consultants), joint ventures (e.g., the Euro-Partenariat program), and assistance with technical, 
administrative and regulatory matters. Specific areas mentioned in the EMA include regional 
cooperation, education and training, science and technology, the environment, modernization of 
industry (including agricultural processing), promotion and protection of investment (e.g., negotiating 
investment protection and double taxation treaties), standardization and conformity assessment 
(introduction of EU procedures/rules, upgrading Tunisian testing labs), approximation of economic 
legislation, financial services (supporting restructuring; improving auditing and supervision), 
agriculture and fisheries (modernization, diversification), transport (modernization and restructuring; 
management; quality upgrading), telecommunications and information technology (standardization, 
introduction of EDI and ISDN), energy, tourism, and statistics. 
The various Articles alluded to above are largely oriented towards upgrading Tunisian infrastructure 
broadly defined (both physical and regulatory) and providing support for restructuring of the 
economy. This support is not just reflected in technical assistance and advice, but is supported by 
financial assistance as well (see below). The specific mentioning of an issue area under the economic 
cooperation chapter presumably signals that this is a legitimate subject for using EU financial 
resources. One area of great importance for many countries in the region is cooperation on customs 
matters (Article 59). The aim of such cooperation is the simplification of procedures, the introduction 
of the EU's Single Administrative Document and linking EU and Tunisian transit systems. Active 
cooperation on these matters will be important for trade facilitation. Another issue area that is 
important is standardization and conformity assessment. The longer run objective of the EMA is to 
conclude agreements for the mutual recognition of certification (Article 40). 
Social and Cultural Cooperation This includes a number of Articles guaranteeing national treatment 
for Tunisian and EU nationals that have found legitimate employment in the partner country. As far 
as movement of workers is concerned, Parties are only committed to "dialogue" aimed at achieving 
progress in this area. Priority is to be given to projects and programs to reduce migratory pressure, 
inter alia by creating jobs and developing training in areas from which emigrants come; promoting the 
role of women through education; improving social protection and health cover systems; and improve 
living conditions in poor, densely populated areas (Article 71). 
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Financial Cooperation As mentioned earlier, Mediterranean countries have received financial 
transfers from the EU under auspices of revolving 5-year Financial Protocols. The sums involved 
vary per country, but are significant. During the period of the Fourth Protocol (1991-96), Tunisia 
was allocated a total of ECU 284 million. 1' Under the EMA approach, financial protocols will not 
be renewed. Instead, the EU envisages earmarking a total amount of assistance--grants and loans--for 
all the Mediterranean countries. Individual allocations out of this total would not be pre-determined, 
but would in part be endogenous--depending on country performance, including the implementation 
of the EMA. Although not spelled out explicitly in the EMA, the Articles in the EMA on financial 
cooperation put emphasis on the link between EMA implementation and the provision of financial 
resources. 
Article 75 of the Tunisian EMA states that "With a view to full attainment on the Agreement's 
objectives, financial cooperation ... shall entail: 
facilitating reforms aimed at modernizing the economy; 
updating economic infrastructure; 
promoting private investment and job creation activities; 
taking into account the effects of the progressive introduction of a free trade area on the 
Tunisian economy, in particular where the updating and restructuring of industry is 
concerned; 
flanking measures for policies implemented in the social sectors. 
Moreover, Article 76 goes on to say that the Community will examine ways to support structural 
adjustment policies needed to restore financial equilibrium, while Article 77 seeks to establish a basis 
for coordinated approaches to dealing with "exceptional macroeconomic and financial problems 
which could stem from the progressive implementation of the Agreement." However, the exact 
modalities of financial cooperation are vague, the relevant procedures to "be adopted by mutual 
agreement between the Parties by means of the most suitable instruments once the Agreement enters 
into force" (Article 75). How future financial transfers will compare to past flows remains to be seen, 
although the absolute value of transfers is expected to increase. Some ECU 4.7 billion has been 
earmarked to support Mediterranean countries, to be complemented by an equivalent amount of 
European Investment Bank resources. 
Evaluation 
To what extent will the EMA help MENA countries catch up with the CEECs? In principle, the 
liberalization' of trade should do much to induce firms to upgrade their production capacity and 
improve their efficiency. In the long run the EMA is likely to be beneficial to all of the countries 
involved. But it should be remembered that in principle the exercise may be economically welfare- 
reducing in the short- to medium-run. Even if not, there can easily be significant opportunity costs 
" The amounts have been steadily increasing in nominal terms. During 1978-81, Tunisia obtained ECU 95 million. 
This rose to ECU 139 during 1981-86 and ECU 224 during 1986-91. 
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associated with preferential trading arrangements. The EMA's major potential advantage is that it 
provides a commitment mechanism to MENA governments, allowing a gradual reform path to be 
more credible than otherwise. Credibility may be enhanced through the binding nature of the 
agreement, the implicit linkage that has been made between official financial transfers from the EU 
and implementation of the EMA, and the offer of wide-ranging technical assistance to help 
Mediterranean countries improve the administration of their regulatory regimes (e.g., customs; 
certification of product standards). 
However, the absence of binding commitments in the areas of direct investment and supply of 
services, and the maintenance of antidumping, suggests that one potential justification for regional 
arrangements mentioned in Section II has not been met. That is, the EMA does not go significantly 
beyond existing multilateral (WTO) disciplines. Moreover, the transition path to free trade with the 
EU is a long one, with liberalization of goods competing with domestic production only starting five 
years after the entry into force of the agreements. This may well reduce the incentives to initiate rapid 
restructuring, and may create problems in implementing tariff reductions in the future (e.g., through 
pressure for safeguard protection). The gradual liberalization may also be too slow in terms of 
maintaining existing export markets and capturing new ones in the face of increased competition from 
the CEECs and Asian economies, driven by the liberalization achieved in the Uruguay Round. 
A potential rationale in favor of regional integration noted earlier is the existence of enforcement 
mechanisms that are more efficacious than those available under the WTO. In the EMA context, 
dispute settlement is dealt with by the Association Council. In the case of a dispute that cannot be 
addressed through consultations with the Council, one of the Parties may appoint an arbitrator. The 
other Party is then required to appoint a second arbitrator within two months, and the Association 
Council appoints a third one. Decisions by the three arbitrators will be taken by majority vote, with 
the Parties required to implement them. This goes beyond the WTO, where parties to a dispute are 
always free not to implement a recommendation by a WTO panel if they are willing to succumb to 
possible retaliation. Time will tell how this dispute settlement mechanism will work. It is important 
to note, however, that dispute settlement will only work if there are binding obligations. In a number 
of areas that are particularly relevant from a market access viewpoint such obligations have yet to be 
established, e.g., as regards product standards. Disputes on such issues, e.g., allegations that 
standards are used as non-tariff barriers, can only be dealt with by the WTO. 
It is important that concurrently with the implementation of the EMA, external barriers to trade and 
foreign investment are reduced as well. A key issue here is the trade diversion question--the extent 
to which a shift away from efficient third country suppliers toward less efficient EU firms occurs, and 
the efficiency losses and implicit tariff revenue transfer that is associated with this. Given the lack of 
enhanced market access for Tunisian agricultural products, the extent of possible trade creation gains 
were limited. Much also depends in this connection on the value of the economic and financial 
cooperation that will flow from the EU to Tunisia (and the other Mediterranean partners). Another 
potential problem that may arise in this connection is the reliance on customs tariff for government 
revenue. As tariffs on EU goods decline to zero, if alternative tax bases are not created it may prove 
difficult to reduce MFN rates. 
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Of course, these are all potential problems, and arguments can be made to defend the liberalization 
strategy that was chosen. Thus, it may well be that by lowering tariffs on intermediates and capital 
goods first, domestic industries are granted some up front compensation for the adjustment costs that 
must be incurred later, and are given time in which to restructure. It could also be argued that this 
strategy ensures that tariff revenues will initially decline slowly, again giving more time to create 
alternative sources of funds for the Government. But the possible downside of the strategy should 
be recognized. Very much clearly depends on the extent to which complementary actions are pursued 
to improve the functioning of the economy. Important in this connection is the fact that the EMA 
does little to ensure investors of national treatment or to grant the general right of establishment. 
This is a significant difference with the CEEC Agreements, which clearly spell out that right of 
establishment is a central part of the deal. Such establishment is permitted immediately for most 
activities, and a transition path is spelled out for the remainder. By signalling the fact that they are 
open to FDI and willing to lock this in, the CEECs increased the incentives for foreign firms to 
establish and transfer much needed know-how by reducing political risk. FDI is especially important 
in the services area, where establishment often remains the best way to contest a market. Efficient 
services are crucial in terms of being able to participate in the global economy: telecommunications, 
information technology, port services, financial intermediation, and business support services are all 
key elements underlying the ability to compete on world markets. By limiting commitments to those 
made in the GATS, the EMA risks sending a signal that liberalization is not on the immediate agenda. 
It also puts the burden on unilateral efforts by Mediterranean countries to move forward. 
An important factor underlying CEEC export performance is the fact that firms are able to exploit 
sub-contracting of manufacturing products for export to the EU in a much greater degree than most 
MENA countries. Such OPT is important, as it greatly facilitates the penetration of EU markets. 
Foreign (EU) partners generally take care of distribution and quality control. OPT activities are 
frequently time-sensitive. Under just-in-time management practices, the availability of adequate 
service links (transport, harbor services, customs operations, telecommunications ...) become 
fundamental for the decision on where to outsource. Geography suggests that many Mediterranean 
countries could become competitive locations for outsourcing by European companies if access to 
efficient producer services is made available. Morocco and Tunisia illustrate this, these being the only 
two MENA countries to make use of OPT. However, in many countries in the region significant 
changes in regulatory regimes and investment policies are required to improve the efficiency of 
service providers. Greater competition will do much to reduce price-cost margins and upgrade 
quality. 
Actions to reduce the role of the state are particularly important. Indeed, the need to reform 
regulatory regimes affecting FDI and the operation of the service sector is part of a more general need 
to reduce the size of the public sector. Privatization of state-owned enterprises is a necessary 
condition for economic recovery and longer-run growth. Refraining from privatization will slow 
down the necessary adjustment process. Gradual implementation of free trade with the EU will put 
public sector enterprises under pressure to restructure, giving rise to pressure for assistance 
(subsidies; tax concessions; soft directed credit; capital infusions; increase in import barriers). The 
net costs of an EMA without a significant privatization effort are likely to be much higher than if the 
implementation of the EMA is complemented by deregulation and privatization. At the very least, 
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it would appear necessary that state firms confront hard budget constraints. Whether this is easier 
to achieve than privatization is an open question.15 
There are important political economy issues here. Many MENA countries have a significant stock 
of educated workers that are either employed directly by the government administration or by state- 
owned firms. They also have large pools of unskilled, underemployed labor. In addition, some 
countries such as Egypt have a substantial stock of unemployed university graduates (World Bank, 
1995b). A necessary condition for the implementation of the EMA to be politically feasible is that 
increased job opportunities for the unskilled and the educated unemployed materialize, and that job 
losses in the state sector remain politically manageable. Greater employment opportunities for the 
unskilled may emerge through the creation of firms specializing in labor-intensive production (in part 
through exploiting the OPT option) and by improving access for agricultural exports. The latter has 
been excluded; a necessary condition for the former is the existence of adequate infrastructure and 
the absence of red tape (regulations, tax administration, customs). As far as the more highly educated 
are concerned, many of the potential job opportunities lie in the service sector. Realizing this 
potential requires deregulating services activities and allowing establishment by foreign providers. 
Even then, realism suggests that in countries where the existing labor force employed in services is 
already significant, net losses may well occur initially. FDI can do much to stimulate both labor- 
intensive and more skilled activities, be they in services or manufacturing, but it will only materialize 
if the regulatory and institutional environment is conducive to private sector investment. Indeed, in 
the absence of improvements in the legal and regulatory framework, opening up to trade with the EU 
may result in greater competition from imports without much in the way of new investment. If so, 
the political viability of EMA implementation will decline. Much will also depend in this connection 
on how EU financial assistance is used. A strong case can be made that there may be a high payoff 
for using EU grants to fund worker compensation schemes to facilitate downsizing of the public 
sector (World Bank, 1995b). The wording of the Articles in the EMA on the scope and priorities for 
financial and economic cooperation is such that such funding should be possible. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
There is increasing evidence that trade liberalization and integration into the global economy is 
associated with higher rates of economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995). A problem confronting 
any government seeking to shift from an inward-looking to an export-oriented trade regime is the 
need to offset resistance by interest groups that are likely to lose in the transition to a liberal 
environment. In the mid to late 1980s, this political economy constraint was overcome by many 
countries in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe as the result of external developments-- 
the debt crisis, the fall of communism. In conjunction with the promise of large private financial 
inflows in the case of Latin America, and integration into Europe in the case of the CEECs, 
governments were able to "sell" broad-based economic reform (Rodrik, 1995). The MENA region 
15 In general, the answer may well be yes if the Government desires to reduce resource flows to the public sector 
enterprises. By imposing an aggregate ceiling on the amount of such transfers, it may be able to insulate itself somewhat 
from individual claimants. Much depends here on the objective of the Government. 
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did not participate in the "shock approach" to reform. It pursued a very gradual reform path. In part 
this was because governments were not convinced of the need for wide-ranging market opening-- 
there was no external factor similar to debt in Latin America--but perhaps more importantly because 
of the political costs that were expected from pursuing such a course. 
The CEECs illustrate that far-reaching liberalization and a strategy of greater integration with the EU 
and the rest of the world will greatly expand trade and export-oriented production. Although the 
transition has been painful, the CEECs are now all experiencing real growth. The Europe 
Agreements are by no means the primary factor underlying CEEC economic performance, but they 
probably have been an important element in anchoring expectations. The EMA option provides a 
unique opportunity to the Mediterranean countries to credibly pursue far-reaching liberalization of 
trade in a gradual fashion. In this respect they are therefore very beneficial. But in themselves the 
EMAs are not enough. They are limited to the liberalization of trade in manufactured products. They 
do little more than contain hortatory language as regards the liberalization of service markets and 
foreign investment, something that is required to help ensure a supply response and create new 
employment opportunities. 
The absence of commitments in these areas may be related in part to the issue of privatization and the 
role of the State. Without public sector reform--at a minimum the introduction of hard budget 
constraints--the impact of trade liberalization will both be muted and possible more intense. The 
impact may be muted because public enterprises are given preferential treatment and retain substantial 
market power. The impact may be exacerbated if public enterprises are forced to adjust, but new 
employment opportunities do not emerge because barriers to entry continue to exist. The recent 
literature evaluating alternative explanations for the success of particular countries in attaining and 
sustaining high rates of economic growth concludes that while openness to the world economy is very 
important, in itself it is not enough. Equally important are efficient public institutions, domestic 
competition, a well-functioning service sector (finance, infrastructure, distribution, etc.), investment 
in human resources (education), high rates of private saving and investment, and a stable macro- 
economy. These factors cannot all be "imported" through an agreement with the EU. Some, 
however, could have been included in the EMA, thereby reducing the burden on Mediterranean 
countries to unilaterally pursue the reforms needed. As emphasized earlier, the policy regimes 
pertaining to FIJI and the service sector are of particular importance in this connection. By not 
committing to a concrete transition path to achieve a liberal environment for these areas, an 
opportunity was missed, especially considering the magnitude of the (flight) capital owned by 
nationals of the region (World Bank, 1995a). 
A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to the issue of the long-term goal as regards the level 
of MFN tariffs that will be imposed on third countries. As noted in Section II, one way for a regional 
agreement to be unambiguously welfare-improving is if the EMA is used as a deliberate strategy to 
offset existing political economy constraints on unilateral liberalization through the use of the financial 
and economic assistance that is on offer. Although this may indeed be the objective of Governments 
in the region, they have not publicized it. Without such an explicitly stated long-term perspective, 
it may prove more difficult than otherwise for Governments to reduce MFN tariffs substantially in 
the future. This is because incentives will be created for not only domestic firms to seek to continue 
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to benefit from somewhat sheltered home markets, but EU firms fearing competition from third 
countries may also be induced to lobby for protection to be maintained. A clear time-table and 
transition path to be pursued concurrently with the implementation of the EMA would do much to 
avoid such problems, and provide a strong signal to domestic producers that what ultimately counts 
is not the regional market, but the world market. 
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Appendix Table 1: Trade Taxes in MENA and East European Countries, 1993 
Share of Import 
Duties in Total 
Government 
Revenue 
Share of "Other" 







Morocco 17.7 52 17.5 
Tunisia 28.3 46 18.7 
Egypt 10.0 8 14.9 
Jordan 35.9 40 17.8 
Syria 10.0 25 16.4 
Oman 3.2 -- 3.0 
UAE -- -- 
Yemen 20.2 3 19.1+ 
Bahrain 9.2 -- 4.0 
Bulgaria 4.6 17 7.9 
Czech Rep. 3.9 23 2.2 
Hungary (1991) 5.8 -- 8.6 
Poland 6.5 -- 5.9 
Romania 3.8 -- 7.0 
Notes: -- zero or negligible; ' Excludes stamp duties; + Valued at the average parallel market exchange rate, the 
average collection rate was around 8 percent. 
Source: IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, 1994; International Financial Statistics, 1994. 
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Appendix Table 2: Correlation of RCA Indices of Exports to the EU, 1993 
JOR LEB SYR ALG SA KUW TUN UAE MOR ISR EGY 
JORDAN 1.00 
LEBANON -0.02 1.00 
SYRIA 0.01 0.44 1.00 
ALGERIA -0.04 -0.04 0.25 1.00 
SAUDI 0.01 -0.04 0.55 0.46 1.00 
ARABIA 
KUWAIT 0.09 -0.01 0.56 0.46 0.95 1.00 
TUNISIA 0.16 0.01 -0.01 0.39 -0.04 -0.02 1.00 
U.A.E. 0.10 0.07 0.14 0.02 0.17 0.22 0.12 1.00 
MOROCCO 0.17 0.00 -0.03 0.65 -0.05 -0.04 0.64 -0.00 1.00 
ISRAEL 0.21 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.09 -0.04 0.14 1.00 
EGYPT 0.09 0.12 0.63 0.11 0.30 0.32 0.10 0.17 0.05 0.00 1.00 
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